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Abstract
We analyze a unionized duopoly model to examine how unions a®ect the incentives
for merger. We ¯nd that, once the union has the option to delegate, an increase in
the union bargaining power can create incentives for the ¯rms to merge.
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473945.1 Introduction
Labor market organization plays an important role in determining wage levels and product
market structure (see e.g. Horn and Wolinsky, 1988). This paper incorporates the option
for unions to delegate the wage bargaining and analyzes how it a®ects the incentives for
merger.
Up to now the literature has mainly focused on strategic delegation on behalf of share-
holders. Fershtman and Judd (1987) were ¯rst to address the issue of strategic managerial
delegation in the context of oligopolistic industries with Cournot competition (see also
Sklivas, 1987). More recently, Gonz¶ alez-Maestre and L¶ opez-Cu~ nat (2001) have consid-
ered the interactions between the use of strategic managerial delegation and mergers.
They have shown that the incentives for merger, under managerial delegation, are con-
siderably increased with respect to the setting without delegation. Regarding strategic
union delegation, Conlin and Furusawa (2000) have provided an explanation of why senior
union members may represent the union in contract negotiations with a monopolist. By
strategically delegating contract negotiations to wage-maximizing individuals, the surplus-
maximizing union may be better o® than if surplus-maximizing individuals negotiate the
contract.
In this paper we go further by dealing with the interactions between the strategic use
of union delegation and the incentives for merger in duopolistic markets. In what follows
we show that unionization does not always reduce the incentives for merger as advocated
in Horn and Wolinsky (1988). Indeed, we ¯nd that, once the union has the option to
delegate, an increase in the union bargaining power can create incentives for the ¯rms to
merge. Precisely, both ¯rms may ¯nd pro¯table to merge and negotiate the wage with
surplus-maximizing delegates in order to avoid having to bargain with wage-maximizing
delegates. Moreover, we show that in such equilibrium the option of strategic delegation
harms both the unions and the ¯rms.
Animportant consequence of those ¯ndings is that one shouldquestionthe wisdom that
unionization decreases incentives for merger and that strategic union delegation increases
bene¯ts for the union.
2 The Basic Model
Consider a duopolistic market for a single homogenous product, where the demand is
linear and is given by P = a¡b¢Q, P is the market price, and Q is the aggregate quantity
demanded. There are two ¯rms indexed by i, i = 1;2. Let Qi denote the quantity
produced by ¯rm i, and let ¦i denote the pro¯t level of each ¯rm i. The only variable
1input is labor. Technology exhibits constant returns to scale and is normalized in such a
way that Qi = Li, where Li is labor input, and the unit production cost of each ¯rm is
the wage Wi. Thus, the pro¯t of each ¯rm is given by
¦i = (a ¡bQ)Qi ¡ Wi ¢ Qi.
Each ¯rm belongs to and is controlled by one risk-neutral owner. The objective of each
owner is to maximize pro¯ts. In addition, each ¯rm is unionized, and enters into a closed-
shop agreement with its risk-neutral union. The workforce for each ¯rm is drawn from
separate pools of labor, and the union objective is to maximize the union surplus, taking
as given the wage obtained by the other union:
Ui = Li ¢ (Wi ¡ W),
where W is the reservation wage.
We study a four-stage game. In stage one, the owners of the ¯rms decide whether or not
to merge both ¯rms.1 In stage two, the surplus-maximizing union (of each ¯rm simulta-
neously) chooses whether to use surplus-maximizing delegates or to use wage-maximizing
delegates (such as senior union members) who will negotiate the wage with the employer.
The objective of a wage-maximizing delegate is simply Vi = Wi ¡ W. In stage three, the
wage bargaining occurs. Finally, in stage four the employer chooses the output level. The
model is solved backwards.
In the last stage of the game, two cases have to be distinguished. First, we consider the
case in which the ¯rms have not merged, i.e. the duopoly case. Then, knowing that the
wage levels (W1 and W2) have already been determined, the employers of the two ¯rms
compete by choosing simultaneously their outputs to maximize their pro¯ts. The Nash












where the subscript "D" identi¯es the duopoly. Second, we consider the case in which
the ¯rms have merged to form a monopoly. Then, knowing that the wage level (W) has








where the subscript "M" identi¯es the monopoly.
1To keep the model as simple as possible it is assumed that once both ¯rms merge both unions merge
too. This could be derived endogenously by allowing both unions to choose whether or not to merge once
both ¯rms have already merged (see Horn and Wolinsky, 1988). Another interpretation is that a merger
implies the concentration of all activities in a single plant.
23 The Duopoly Case
In the third stage wage bargaining occurs. Inside each ¯rm the employer and the union
delegate negotiate the wage level foreseeing perfectly the e®ect of wages on output and
employment levels. The two negotiations take place simultaneously and independently.
That is, when negotiating the wage, the employer and the union delegate take the other
¯rm's wage as given. We model the outcomes of the bargaining by using the formula of
an asymmetric Nash bargaining solution which is interpreted as the limit of the subgame
perfect equilibrium of the Rubinstein (1982) bargaining model when the lag between o®ers
converges to zero (see Binmore et al., 1986).
First, we consider the case in which in both ¯rms the union sends surplus-maximizing







L1(W1;W2) ¢ (W1 ¡ W)
i°




L2(W1;W2) ¢ (W2 ¡ W)
i°
¢[(P ¡ W2) ¢ Q2(W1;W2)]
1¡°
where ° 2 (0;1) is the union bargaining power and the disagreement points of both ¯rms
and unions are zero. Solving these simultaneously yields the following solution for wages,
ouputs, pro¯ts and unions payo®s:
W ss
1D = W ss
2D = W +
°
4 ¡ °
(a ¡ W), Qss
1D = Qss
2D =















2°(2¡ °)(a ¡ W)2
3b(4 ¡ °)2 ,
where the superscript "ss" means that union 1 chooses surplus-maximizing delegates and
union 2 chooses surplus-maximizing delegates.
Second, we consider the case in which in both ¯rms the union sends wage-maximizing
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4°(1 ¡ °)(a ¡ W)2
3b(4 ¡3°)2 ,
3where the superscript "ww" means that union 1 chooses wage-maximizing delegates and
union 2 chooses wage-maximizing delegates.
Finally, we consider the asymmetric cases in which the union of ¯rm i chooses wage-
maximizing delegates and the union of ¯rm j chooses surplus-maximizing delegates. Then,












Lj(Wi;Wj) ¢ (Wj ¡W)
i°
¢ [(P ¡ Wj) ¢ Qj(Wi;Wj)]
1¡°
Solving these simultaneously yields the following solution for wages and unions payo®s:
Wws
1D = W sw
2D = W +
°(4 + °)
8(2 ¡°) ¡ °2(a ¡ W), W ws
2D = Wsw
1D = W +
°(4 ¡°)




°(4 + °)(16 ¡12° ¡4°2)(a ¡ W)2





°(4 ¡ °)(16 ¡12° +2°2)(a ¡ W)2
3b[8(2 ¡°) ¡ °2]
2 ,
where the superscript "ws (sw)" means that union 1 (2) chooses wage-maximizing dele-
gates and union 2 (1) chooses surplus-maximizing delegates. Comparing the equilibrium
wage expressions con¯rms our expectations. Wage-maximizing delegates obtain higher
wage levels than surplus-maximizing delegates do : Www
1D > Wws








Inthe secondstage, the unions simultaneously choose whetherto use surplus-maximizing
delegates or wage-maximizing delegates to negotiate the wage with the employer. The pro-
¯le in which both unions choose surplus-maximizing delegates is a Nash equilibrium of the




2D. Hence, there is a ° such that the
pro¯le in which both unions choose surplus-maximizing delegates is a Nash equilibrium if
and only if ° ¸ ° ' :79. The pro¯le in which both unions choose wage-maximizing dele-





Hence, there is a °D such that the pro¯le in which both unions choose wage-maximizing
delegates is a Nash equilibrium if and only if ° · °D ' :81.
Two remarks have to be made. First, an asymmetric pro¯le where one union chooses
a surplus-maximizing delegate and the other union chooses a wage-maximizing delegate
is never a Nash equilibrium. Second, for ° 2 [°;°D] we have two Nash equilibria but only
one seems to be a reasonable outcome. Indeed, one can easily show that the outcome
where both unions send wage-maximizing delegates is the unique coalition-proof Nash
equilibrium outcome (because of Uww
iD ¸ Uss
iD, i = 1;2). Bernheim et al. (1987) have
4de¯ned a Nash strategy combination as a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium if no coalition of
players could form a self-enforcing agreement to deviate from it. To summarize, the union
in each ¯rm will choose a wage-maximizing delegate if and only if the union bargaining
power is not too strong, ° · °D.
4 The Monopoly Case
In case the union sends surplus-maximizing delegates, the predicted wage is given by
W = argmax
h
L(W) ¢ (W ¡W)
i°




M = W +
°
2
(a ¡ W), Qs
M =
















where the superscript "s" means that the union sends surplus-maximizing delegates to
negotiate with the monopolist.






























where the superscript "w" means that the union chooses wage-maximizing delegates.
In the second stage, the union chooses whether to use surplus-maximizing delegates
or wage-maximizing delegates to negotiate the wage with the monopolist. The union
will choose wage-maximizing delegates if and only if Uw
M ¸ Us
M, that is, if and only if
8(1 ¡ °) ¡ (2 ¡ °)3 ¸ 0. Hence, there is a °M such that the outcome where the union
chooses wage-maximizing delegates is an equilibrium outcome of the stage game if and
only if ° · °M ' :76.
55 Merger Incentives and Competition Policy
In this section we investigate how the option the union has to use strategic delegation will
a®ect the incentives for merger. Before answering this question we consider the benchmark
where unions do not have the option of strategic delegation. We say that both ¯rms have
incentives or it is pro¯table for them to merge if and only if ¦M ¸ ¦1D+¦2D. Without the




Hence, a merger will take place if and only if unions are weak, ° · 12¡8
p
2
3 ' :23. Indeed,
when unions are strong enough, then ¯rms have no incentives to merge because by merging
the wage spillover e®ects which before were pushing down the wages would disappear.
Proposition 1 If unions cannot use strategic delegation, then ¯rms have incentives to




One would be tempted to conclude that unionization or strong unions will decrease
the incentives for merger. Then, by giving the option of strategic delegation to the union,
one would expect that the pro¯tability of mergers would decrease even more. As we show
next there is no clear answer.
If ° · °M then both under the duopoly and the monopoly situations wage-maximizing









2 ' :205. This result seems to suggest that
strategic union delegation would reduce incentives for merger. But this is not always true.
If ° 2 [°M;°D] then a merger enables both ¯rms to switch from a duopolistic equilib-
rium in which wage-maximizing delegates are sent to a monopolistic equilibrium in which
surplus-maximizing delegates are sent. That is, a merger switches the equilibrium regime
with respect to the choice of delegates. Since ¦s
M ¸ ¦ww
1D + ¦ww
2D for ° 2 [°M;°D], it is
optimal for the ¯rms to merge and negotiate the wage with surplus-maximizing delegates
in order to avoid a duopoly where negotiations would take place with wage-maximizing
delegates.
Proposition 2 If unions can use strategic delegation, then ¯rms are going to merge if and





2 , or the union bargaining power is
strong but not too strong, ° 2 [°M;°D].
Finally, one should notice that the option of strategic delegation will harm both the
¯rms and the unions when ° 2 [°M;°D]. Indeed, we observe that the equilibrium outcome








6To summarize, strategic union delegation will decrease the incentives for merger when
the union bargaining power is weak. However, if the union has a strong bargaining power,
then strategic delegation might create incentives for the ¯rms to merge.
In terms of competition policy, one should be careful when drawing conclusions with
respect to unions and incentives for merger. Indeed, an increase in the union bargaining
power will tend to diminish the incentives for merger. But, once we allow for strategic del-
egation (for example, by means of laws protecting union delegates from being dismissed),
¯rms might be pushed to merge even if unions are strong, because a merger enables them
to switch from bilateral negotiations with wage-maximizing delegates to a single negotia-
tion with surplus-maximizing delegates. Moreover, they might end up in a situation where
both the ¯rms and the unions are worse o® compared to the case without the possibility
of delegation.
References
[1] Bernheim, B.D., B. Peleg and M. Whinston, 1987, "Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria I:
Concepts," Journal of Economic Theory 42, 1-12.
[2] Binmore, K.G., A. Rubinstein, and A. Wolinsky, 1986, "The Nash Bargaining Solution
in Economic Modelling," Rand Journal of Economics 17, 176-188.
[3] Conlin, M. and T. Furusawa, 2000, "Strategic Delegation and Delay in Negotiations
over the Bargaining Agenda," Journal of Labor Economics 18(1), 55-73.
[4] Fershtman, C. and K.L. Judd, 1987, "Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly," American
Economic Review 77(5), 927-940.
[5] Gonz¶ alez-Maestre, M. and J. L¶ opez-Cu~ nat, 2001, "Delegation and Mergers in
Oligopoly," International Journal of Industrial Organization 19, 1263-1279.
[6] Horn, H. and A. Wolinsky, 1988, "Bilateral Monopolies and Incentives for Merger,"
Rand Journal of Economics 19, 409-419.
[7] Rubinstein, A., 1982, "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica 50,
97-109.
[8] Sklivas, S., 1987, "The Strategic Choice of Managerial Incentives," Rand Journal of
Economics 18, 452-458.
7